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In the matter
of
Local 144, S.E.I.U., A.F.L.-C.I.O.

CERTIFICATION
OF
CARD COUNT RESULTS

and

Manhattanville Nursing Care Center, Inc.

x
I, the undersigned Arbitrator, appointed by mutual consent
of the parties, conducted a card
Card

Count

was

conducted

count on

pursuant

October 6,

to

two

(2)

1989.

The

Recognition

Agreements, dated September 25, 1989, entered

into by

Local 144,

Hotel,

Allied

Services

Union and

Inc.

Said

Hospital,

Manhattanville

Nursing

Nursing

Home

Care

and

Center,

Recognition

Agreements were submitted to the Arbitrator as Exhibit 1 (2 pages)
and Exhibit 1A (2

pages) which

are attached

hereto.

Exhibit 1

concerns a Service and Maintenance unit; and Exhibit 1A concerns a
Licensed Practical Nurse (LPN) unit.
the

two

(2)

Recognition

The terms

Agreements

and conditions of

are hereby incorporated by

reference as if fully set forth herein and are an integral hereof.
The Card Count was
(2) units

for recognition

of the

following two

based on a list of eligible employees (Exhibit #2-three

(3) pages-attached hereto).

1. Service and Maintenance Unit:
Including:
nurses

All

aides,

full-time
nurses

and

regular part-time

assistants, dietary aides,

cooks,

maintenance

employees,

recreation assistants,

orderlies,

switchboard

operators and

ward clerks employed at the 311 West 231st Street,
Bronx, New York facility.
Excluding;

All

supervisors

as

other

employees,

defined

in

the

guards

National

and
Labor

Relations Act.
2. Licensed Practical Nurse (LPN) Unit:
Including;

All

full-time

Licensed Practical

and

regular part-time

Nurses (LPNs)

employed at the

311 West 231st Street, Bronx, New York facility.
Excluding;

All

supervisors

as

other

employees,

defined

in

stipulated

to

the

guards

National

and

Labor

Relations Act.
The

parties

the

authenticity

of

the

signatures on the cards produced by Local 144.
I hereby certify that the results were as follows:
Local

144

produced

eighty-seven

Service and Maintenance Unit.

Of

(87)

cards

these

for

cards,

the proposed
seventeen (17)

cards were invalid, and seventy (70) cards were valid, compared to
the list of eighty-four (84) eligible employees, thereby resulting
in cards

from a

majority of

produced ten (10) cards for the
cards, two

the eligible

employees.

proposed L.P.N.

unit.

Local 144
Of these

(2) cards were invalid and eight (8) cards were valid,

compared to a list

of

twelve

(12)

eligible

employees, thereby

resulting in cards from a majority of the employees.

THEREFORE,

Local

144

bargaining representative of the

is

designated

as

the

exclusive

above-described bargaining units

at Manhattanville Nursing Care Center, Inc.

ERIC J. SCHMERTZ
ARBITRATOR7

Before me this date ,
Schmertz to me personally known and /to whose
attest:

_ , came Eric J.
signature (above) I

RECOGNITION AGREEMENT
IT

IS

AGREED,

by

and

between

Local 144, Hotel,

Hospital, Nursing Home and Allied Employees Union, Service
Employees

International

referred to as

the

Care

Inc.

Center

Union,

"Union")

AFL-CIO

and

(hereinafter

Manhattanville Nursing

(hereinafter

referred

to

as

the

"Employer"), that:
WHEREAS, the Union
the

Employer

representative

has

as

the

of

employees

requested

exclusive

recognition from

collective

employed

in

bargaining

the following

bargaining unit:
Included:

All

full

and

aides, nurses
cooks,

regular

part-time nurses

assistants,

maintenance

dietary aides,

employees, orderlies,

JV rrc* a «.***<» oP£*.A-T»*.S

recreation
employed

assistants,
at

the

311

and

ward

(® /

clerks

West 231st Street,

Bronx, New York Facility.
Excluded:

All

other

supervisors

employees,
as

defined

guards
in

and

the National

Labor Relations Act.
AND, WHEREAS, the Employer has agreed to voluntarily
so

recognize

the

Union,

provided

that

establishes by a card count that it represents
of

the

employees

in

the

above

the

Union

a majority

bargaining unit, IT IS

THEREFORE AGREED THAT:
1. The Union will establish, by
it represents

a majority

of the

a card

count, that

employees in the above-

described unit.
J.

Schmertz,

Said card count will be conducted by Eric
and

payment

for

these

services shall be

shared equally by the parties.
2. Upon the Union establishing that
majority

of

the

employees

in

the

it represents a
above-described

bargaining unit, the Employer shall recognize the Union as
the exclusive

collective bargaining representative of the

employees in the bargaining
in good
time

faith with

over

terms

unit and

the Union
and

agrees to negotiate

for a reasonable period of

conditions

of

employment

to

be

embodied in a collective bargaining agreement.
3.

It

unit does

is

not

company with

further

include

agreed that the above-described
any

individual

employed

by any

which the employer has contracted to perform

housekeeping services at the facility.

Dated: jiy

Dated:

_

, 1989

j

^^f A Y^^C^U
Ernest Dicker, Executive Director
Manhattanville Nursing Care Center
f Inc.

__?
ir, Local 144, SEIU,
AFL-^SIO

RECOGNITION AGREEMENT
IT

IS

AGREED,

by

and

between

Local 144, Hotel,

Hospital, Nursing Home and Allied Employees Union, Service
Employees

International

referred to as

the

Care

Inc.

Center

Union,

"Union")

AFL-CIO

and

(hereinafter

Manhattanville Nursing

(hereinafter

referred

to

as

the

"Employer"), that:
WHEREAS, the Union
the

Employer

representative

has

as

the

of

employees

requested

exclusive

recognition from

collective

employed

in

bargaining

the following

bargaining unit:
Included:

All

full-time

and

Licensed Practical
at the

311 West

regular

part-time

Nurses (LPNs) employed
231st Street, Bronx, New

York facility.
Excluded:

All

other

supervisors

employees,
as

defined

guards
in

and

the National

Labor Relations Act.
AND, WHEREAS, the Employer has agreed to voluntarily
so

recognize

the

Union,

provided

that

establishes by a card count that it represents
of

the

employees

in

the

above

the

Union

a majority

bargaining unit, IT IS

THEREFORE AGREED THAT:
1. The Union will establish, by
it represents
described unit.
J.

Schmertz,

a majority

of the

a card

count, that

employees in the above-

Said card count will be conducted by Eric
and

payment

for

these

services shall be

$
shared equally by the parties.
2. Upon the Union establishing that
majority

of

the

employees

in

the

it represents a
above-described

bargaining unit, the Employer shall recognize the Union as
the exclusive

collective bargaining representative of the

employees in the bargaining
in good
time

faith with

over

terms

unit and

the Union
and

agrees to negotiate

for a reasonable period of

conditions

of

employment

to

be

embodied in a collective bargaining agreement.

Dated:

,r

„

.

,£rnest Dicker, Executive Director
/ Manhattanville Nursing Care Center
/
Inc.

Dated: ^&?

, 1989
saxer , Local 144, SEIU,
\I

\JL & }

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Transport Workers Union of
America, Local 100

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
New York Bus Service

The stipulated issues are:
[1] Was there just cause for the three
day suspension of Ray Miller from
December 21? If not what shall be
the remedy?
[2] Was there just cause for the discharge of Ray Miller? If not what
shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on February 24, 1989 at which time Mr.
Miller, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and Company, appeared.

All con-

cerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's

Oath was waived.
There is no dispute that on December 21, 1987 the grievant
was several miles off his route; and that as a result he was ten
minutes late arriving at the location of his assignment.

Addi-

tionally, the Company charges that in an apparent effort to get
from the location off his route (the northern Bronx) to his assignment (at the lower Bronx) he drove at an excessive speed on the
1-95 highway and recklessly at the Bruckner Boulevard exit.
The Company has clearly established and notified its
drivers that being off route is a serious violation.
The grievant offered no reason or explanation for being
so far off route and away from his assignment.

That being so,

-2-

it is not unreasonable to conclude that the grievant was using
the bus for some personal or otherwise improper purpose.
is also a well established rule violation.

That

Additionally, I find

no reason to disbelieve the Company representative who testified
that he saw the grievant driving the bus at an excessive speed
and hazardously.

That the grievant was late to his assignment

makes logical and probable that he was driving fast and without
precautions to try to make up his lateness.

Speeding, and care-

lessness, are of course, serious rule violations, well publicized
to and known by the employees.
The grievant's prior disciplinary record discloses some
earlier problems.

He was involved in two "chargeable" accidents,

and was reinstated on the appeal of the Union after being discharge for "insubordination."

These reports and records were not

challenged, and therefore stand as part of his personnel record.
Under the foregoing circumstances, I cannot find fault
with the imposition of a suspension for the "off route", and
speeding and careless driving offenses.

And I do not find a three

day suspension to be unreasonable.
However, though the grievant committed at least one subsequent offense, I am not convinced that it or they were so serious
as to warrant discharge.

But an additional disciplinary suspension

and final warning are warranted.
Following the foregoing three day suspension, the grievant
violated a Company rule, which he acknowledged he was aware of,
by parking his bus near a bank so that he could cash his check.

It

is undisputed that the bank had objected to this; that the Company
had so advised its drivers, including the grievant, and that the

-3-

grievant disregarded the notice.
However, the additional charge upon which his discharge
was based, namely insubordination for "walking out of" or "refusing to participate" in a disciplinary hearing is not sustained.
I do not think it unreasonable for the grievant to have requested
that a particular steward or union representative be present at
and represent him at the hearing.

Particularly so, when as the

record shows, it would only have been a day or so later when that
Union representative was available.

Of course, the grievant should

not have walked out of the hearing, but I think he was merely
angry and frustrated, and did not intend to be defiant or disrespectful to the level of insubordination.
So, one of the discharge offenses has been proved; the
other has not.

Also, of significance to me is that following the

three day suspension of December 21, 1987, he was warned on
February 17, 1988 that "any more problems may result in suspension"
(emphasis added).

The next "problems" were the parking at the

bank, and walking out of the hearing.

Under the facts and circum-

stances as found, I think the Company is bound at this point to
the penalty it warned would be imposed for further problems.
that penalty is a suspension.

And

I consider it proper and appropriate

that the grievant be denied back pay.
Accordingly, the Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the
collective bargaining agreement between the above-named parties,
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties,
makes the following AWARD:
There was just cause for the three day
suspension of Ray Miller.
There was not just cause for the discharge
of Ray Miller. There is cause for a sus~

-4-

pension without back pay. Accordingly
he shall be reinstated, but without
back pay.
He is expressly warned that further rule
violations would warrant his discharge.

Eric J. Schinertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: March 28, 1989
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

.

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 100 Transport Workers
Union of America
and

OPINION
and
AWARD

New York Bus Service

The stipulated issue is:
[1] What shall be the disposition of the
Union's grievance dated November 30,
1988?
[2] Did the Company have just cause to suspend Ronald Arnold for five days? If
not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on April 11, 1989 at which time representatives of the above-named Union and Employer appeared and
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's

Oath was waived.
Grievance of November 30, 1988
The grievance reads:
On November 23rd the attached notice was
posted early in the P.M. The Trippers
that were cancelled are regularly scheduled Trippers that were picked during the
August '88 pick. Because these Trippers
were cancelled without the drivers consent, the affected drivers are entitled to
their tripper pay.
At the hearing the Union also sought as a remedy affirmation of the right of the affected drivers to a "new pick" under
the Pick Period clause of the contract.
The Union also asserts that its grievance is not limited
to November 23rd, but that the same cancellations took place on
December 23 and 30th,

1988.

-2-

The Company has shown that what it did on November 23, and
December 23 and 30th (each, the day before a holiday) has been
regularly done as a practice when, because of a holiday, a "getaway day" or other circumstance, the ridership (usually returning at the end of the work day) is significantly reduced.
The Company has shown by testimony that it has also done
so in instances of heavy snowfalls, causing a drop in ridership
on regularly scheduled trips, and that the practice has been
followed since 1970 without payment to the drivers affected and
without triggering a new pick.
Even if the foregoing contract section is applicable, the
conditions

for a "new pick" have not been met.

The contract

section "require(s) a new pick if mutually agreed upon by the
Union Committee and the Employer." (emphasis added)

Here, there

has not been any such mutual agreement.
In point, I believe is the language in my Opinion and Award
of December 9, 1986,
Warburton.

in connection with the grievance of Robert

Though I held therein that the Employer assigned a

"surviving trip" to the wrong employee, I stated inter alia:
"When ridership fell off, the Employer decided
that only one of these trips was needed....
Clearly the Employer has the right to discontinue runs and trippers, to change their schedules, and to make run and tripper combinations
for operational needs. In the instant case it
had the right to discontinue one of the two
trips involved."
I also stated in that decision:
"However, the grievant does not and did not have
the remedy of a new pick. The contract requires
mutual agreement of the parties for a new pick
to be offered, and there was no mutual agreement
in this case."
Accordingly, the Union's grievance of November 30, 1988 is
denied.

-3-

Suspension of Ronald Arnold
Mr. Arnold is charged with reckless and careless driving
which endangered two complaining pedestrians.
I am not prepared to sustain a disciplinary penalty on the
sole basis of letters of complaint from

pedestrians or the

public without direct supporting testimony subject to crossexamination.
This is not to say that the complaining letters regarding
the grievant's recklessness towards the pedestrians are untrue,
but rather that the letters alone do not constitute the type of
probative evidence required to meet the requisite standard of
"clear and convincing" evidence.
as it should be,

Their truth cannot be tested,

in the adversary setting of live testimony and

cross-examination.
Also, the Employer has not explained why the complainants
were not called to testify in person, nor is there any explanation
as to why, if at all, it was not possible to get them to testify.
In other matters before me under this impartial chairmanship, members of the riding public and/or pedestrians have appeared
and have testified.

I find no practice or mutual agreement of the

parties to dispense with that process.

Therefore, I see no reason

why that procedure should not be required here, or if not possible,
why there should not be an appropriate explanation.
Accordingly, the Employer's case falls short of the standard
of proof required, and the grievance on behalf of Mr. Arnold is
sustained.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the
following AWARD:

-4-

The Union's grievance dated November
30, 1988 is denied.
The suspension of Ronald Arnold was
not for just cause. It is reversed
and he shall be made whole for the
time lost.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: May 8, 1989
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) s s - :
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 100 Transport Workers
Union of America

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
New York Bus Service

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company have just cause to terminate
Albert Spivey? If not what should the remedy
be?
Hearings were held on February 17, May 2 and June 26, 1989
at which time Mr. Spivey, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant'
and representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. The Arbitrator's Oath was waived. The parties filed post-hearing briefs.
Although there are other charges against the grievant relating to use of offensive language and disciplinary threats to students on his bus; to a rule violation regarding
taking students
"up the hill" to let them off upon return from school rather than
at the prescribed final stop location; to his favoring of female
students and his discouragement of male students from riding his
bus; to his calling out
suggestive remarks to a female pedestrian; to impairment of the safety of a student to whom he gave
money to go to a delicatessen across two streets to buy candy;
these are not the principal allegations against him and, in my
view, are not the ones that caused his discharge.
xI am persuaded that he was discharged because the Company
concluded that he acted toward some of the female student passengers in a manner that was intimate and sexual. It is charged that
he kissed some on the lips, or forehead, or cheeks, or hands; that
he plac ed or pulled one or more onto his lap; that he patted theii
"butts;" that he touched or caressed their hands or arms; that he

-2photographed the breast area (clothed) of one and the "backside"
area of another; and that he suggested a date "to go dancing."
This Arbitrator is familiar with the psychological phenomenon of children, when testifying or complaining about intimacies
or sexually suggestive matters and conduct, to exaggerate the fact^;
misconceive the actions and motives and to fantasize what took
place. However, based on the entire record before me, including
the grievant's testimony in which he made limited admissions to
some less serious parts of the charges (after denying them entirely when first confronted by the Company), I do not think that the
students testified either falsified or fantasized what took
place.
Let me make clear that that is not to say that I conclude
that the grievant had sexual or other willfully improper and intimate motives by his actions, but rather that what he did (and I
accept the testimony of the students as the accurate and credible
evidence of what he did) created a perception of possible impropriety that because of the obvious sensitive nature of the responsibilities of a school bus driver carrying students of intermediate
school age (11 to 14), has fatally undermined his acceptability,
reliability and usefulness as that type of bus driver. In this
sensitive situation, that kind of perception, of the grievant's
making (regardless of the true motive), creates a risk that need
not be further tolerated and therefore constituted grounds for removing the grievant from that type of work arrangement.
Put another way, it is possible that the Company and the
students read more improprieties into the circumstances than were
true. Indeed, based on the entire record, I would not conclude
that the grievant had a sexual motive or sought or was acting out
sexual intimacies with the students. Only the grievant knows for
sure. The record falls short of any such persuasive conclusion.
It is possible, as.he states, that the grievant had a "grandfatherly" interest in and affection for the female students, and,
considering his age of 55 and that he had a family of his own, his

-3actions were nothing more than a manifestation of those grandfatherly impulses. But I am not prepared to conclude that either,
and I cannot fault the Company for not so concluding.
Therefore, as the truth of his motives are not absolutely
established one way or the other, we are left with the perception,
known to the students, to their parents, to the school authorities
and to the Company. And by at least inappropriate and suspicious
actions the grievant is responsible for that perception. That
perception under the circumstances of this case is enough to constitute cause for the disqualification of the grievant from a
school bus driving assignment.
However, considering his approximately 20 years of employment with the Company and his apparently unblemished record before
the instant charges, I am not convinced that he should lose his
employment entirely. As there is room to question his motives
and intentions, including room for a conclusion of innocence of
any intended sexual impropriety on his part, his long and good
prior record and service should weigh in his favor in mitigation.
Accordingly, for his inappropriate and unjustifiable behavior,
I shall reduce his discharge to a suspension and direct his re-employment in and to a different capacity.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the
following AWARD:
The discharge of Albert Spivey is reduced to
a suspension for the period of time he has
been out. He shall be reinstated without back
pay but not as a driver of a school bus for
which he is now disqualified. He shall be
given any other bus driving assignment.

DATE: September 19, 1989
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

-4-

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
TWU Local 100
OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
New York Bus Service

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Seymour Schleider? If not, what shall be
the remedy?
Hearings were duly held, at which time the grievant and
representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine

witnesses. Three

sets of medical opinions were submitted for my review.
FACTS
Seymour Schleider is a bus operator for New York Bus
Service who, in approximately June of 1987 suffered what doctors
have referred to as a cerebrovascular accident while shopping
with his wife.

Mr. Schleider had a similar incident in December

of 1987 albeit, in the doctors opinion, of a less serious nature.
Based on these two incidents, the Company decided to
discharge Mr. Schleider from his bus drivers position as, in
their opinion, he constituted a threat to the safety of their
passengers.

The Union brought this grievance to challenge that

determination.
There is conflicting medical testimony.

Dr. Michael

Swerdlow of Montefiore Medical Center is of the opinion that
Schleider can return to work.

Dr. Stephen Kass of the Neurological

Associates of Westchester is of the opinion that Schleider not be
allowed to return to work.

At the request of the parties the

Undersigned appointed Dr. Fletcher H. McDowell of the Burke

n

Rehabilitation Center to examine Mr. Schleider and to render a
neutral medical opinion as to the fitness of Mr. Schleider.
McDowell

Dr.

is of the opinion that Mr. Schleider's obesity and hyper-

tension increase his risk of having another cerebrovascular accident to the point that the doctor would not recommend his return
to work.
OPINION
Based upon all of the above I find that the Company had
just cause to discharge Seymour Schleider.

From my review of

the medical evidence it appears that Mr. Schleider's weight problem is a significant factor in the recommendation of Doctor
Fletcher J. McDowell that he not return to work.

Accordingly, in

the interest of all parties it is my determination that should
Mr. Schleider lose 60 pounds, he be afforded the opportunity to
be re-examined by Dr. McDowell and be considered for re-employment
based upon the results of such examination.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: February 17, 1989
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT WORKERS
UNION of AMERICA -and- NEW YORK BUS SERVICE

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 100, Transport Workers
Union of America

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
New York Bus Service
The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company have just cause to suspend
Harry Brown for three days? If not what
shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on August 3, 1989 at which time Mr. Brown,
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of
the above-named Union and Company appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross
examine witnesses. The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The grievant was suspended three days for a cumulative record
of excessive absenteeism.
Up to and including a disciplinary warning on February 7,
1989, the grievant's attendance record is not challenged. Over
several years he received several warnings for an unsatisfactory
attendance record, which the Company asserts exceeded the average
of other employees. Those warnings were not contested and therefore stand as valid and indisputable in these proceedings. And,
as those warnings were for poor attendance, that characterization
of his record for that period of time is also not now contestable.
The sole question is whether, subsequent to the warning of
February 7, 1989, the grievant's absences are to be treated as a
continuation of a poor attendance record, justifying, under traditional progressive discipline, the three day suspension and final
warning that are at issue in this case.

-2The Union points out that the grievant's absences after
February 7, 1989 were due to illness - pneumonia and bronchitis
(extending and accounting for two weeks) and a one day hospitalization for "chest pains" that came on him while driving his bus
causing him to be taken from his bus to the hospital by ambulance.
It also notes that two absences were only for half days each and
that they came about because he had to help his ill wife.
Standing alone, the reasons for the grievant's absences after
February 7, 1989 would not be grounds for a disciplinary suspension. Indeed, if his prior record had been satisfactory, those
absences might even be excusable as emergencies and illness exceptions to an otherwise good record. But they do not stand alone.
They follow an incontestable period of several years during which
the grievant accumulated several disciplinary warnings for a recorc.
of poor attendance.

There comes a point, which I have repeatedly

stated, and which is universally recognized by arbitrators, when
an absentee record is chronic and when an employer need not tolerate it further, even if the absences are beyond the employee's
.
fault or control. Where, as here, the employer operates a service
that is founded and relies on the regular and timely attendance
of its employees delivering

that service, chronic absenteeism or

an inability to report to work promptly and regularly, are recognized grounds for discipline, regardless of the reasons or seemingly good explanations for that poor attendance. In fact, the
contract contemplates this circumstance. It authorizes discipline
not just for "unexcused" absences but also for "excessive" absenteeism.
Unfortunately, the grievant's record reached that point.
Against the backdrop of his several warnings, and the further
warning of February 7, 1989, the grievant's subsequent absences,
even though due to illness or other understandable reasons, were
nonetheless, a continuation of his unacceptable attendance record,
and properly interpreted by the Company as an inability on his
part to comply with and maintain the type of attendance required

-3of his job.
Had this been a discharge case, I would have given the grievant one final chance to bring his attendance record to a satisfactory level, by reducing any such discharge to a suspension.
But he has not been discharged.

The suspension of three days

and the final warning imposed by the Company are proper, and what
is required at this point in the application of progressive discipline.

The grievant has the chance to save his job by a diligent

and successful effort to make his attendance record satisfactory.
In part that is the purpose of the suspension and final warning,
and it is hoped that he will respond constructively so that the
ultimate step of discharge for this employee of ten years service,
will be obviated.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective bargaining agreement between the above-named parties, and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the follow
ing AWARD:
There was just cause for the three day suspension
and final warning of Harry Brown.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATEd: August 14, 1989
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )':
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Professional Staff Association

OPINION AND AWARD
Case No. 1930 004 389

and
New York State United Teachers

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Employer violate Article VI B.3(a) of
the collective bargaining agreement when it
denied Donald Pierce 's application for extended sick leave? If so, what should be the
remedy?
Hearings were held on April 28 and May 15, 1989 at which
time Mr. Pierce, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and
representatives of the above-named Association and Employer appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Certain facts are undisputed.

The grievant suffers from

chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and pulmonary impairment.
At the time that he applied for the extended sick leave that is
the subject of this case, he had exhausted his regular sick leave
benefits .
Article VI B.3(a) reads in pertinent part:
Effective September 1, 1984, extended sick leave
shall accumulate to a maximum of two years (to
be paid at full salary) , in the case of a serious
illness or disability which prevents the employee
from performing his/her professional responsibilities. This leave shall be granted only after the
employee has exhausted all of his/her previously
accumulated sick leave credits. The applicant for
such a leave must submit prior to the granting of
such leave, a report from his/her physician, or a
medical facility, stating the prognosis with regard
to the possibility of returning to work and the
approximate date of such return.
I find the foregoing language clear and unambiguous.

It not

-2only requires that an employee first exhuast his previously accumulated sick leave benefits (which the grievant did) but also
that the illness or disability for which the extended sick leave
is requested,
"prevents the employee from performing his/
her professional responsibilities." (emphasis

added)

Based on the latter eligibility requirement, the grievant's
application for extended sick leave was premature.
from a serious and chronic illness.

Obviously it has made the

performance of his duties difficult.
his professional responsibilities.
economic reasons.

He suffers

Yet he has been performing

I believe he has done so for

Apparently he is not financially able to re-

tire, and is not yet eligible for the contractual disability
benefit.
That he may be or has been out on given days from time to
time because of his illness, does not yet meet the mandated contractual requirement that his illness or disability has "prevented
him from performing his professional responsibilities."
is an absolute term.

"Prevent

It means "to keep from occurring," "pre-

clude," "obviate," "thwart."
and rendering it impossible."

"To prevent is to stop something...
(The Random House Dictionary of The

English Language).
In short, it means an illness or disability of a continuing,
not sporadic, characteristic and effect.

By his own actions, and

by the reports of the physicians, the grievant's condition has not
yet reached that evidentiary point.

Neither he nor the physicians

have said that his illness prevents him from working.
The fact seems to be that he should not be working but is
not yet prevented from doing so.
will not improve.

His chronic condition apparently

It will remain stable or deteriorate.

To work

as a Union representative, with the pressures, tensions and long
and irregular hours involved is probably injurious to his health.
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Yet his physician, Dr. Harlan B. Weinberg did not order him
to stop work or certify that his illness prevented him from working.

Rather Dr. Weinberg only suggested that:
"...since his current level of occupation involves significant physical activity, that he
be allowed to apply for either full-time disability or part-time employment with your firm."
The Employer's physician, following an examination of the

grievant:
"...recommended to Mr. Pierce that it would
be in his best interest to go into retirement since both his symptoms and physiologic
assessment lead me to predict that putting in
a regular work day, especially under stressful
conditions will predictably be poorly tolerated
over time."
In short, neither physician has taken the position that the
grievant's condition prevents working.

Both make clear that for

him to work would be counterproductive to his health and that his
ability to work will decrease with time.
I am most sympathetic to the grievant's problem.
not be working, but is financially unable to stop.

He should

But the arbi-

trator is bound to the contract language and conditions negotiated
and written by the parties.

By limiting extended sick leave to

illness and disabilities that prevent the employee from working,
I conclude that the parties intended that benefit to apply only
when and at the point the employee is incapacitated and unquestionably unable to work.

That being so, based on the evidence in

this case, the grievant has not yet qualified.

I regret very much

the consequences of this holding - namely that his condition must
worsen to the point where it prevents him working, or that it be
so certified medically, before he is eligible, but that is what
the contract requires.
Under this circumstance I need not deal with the question
of whether an adequate prognosis of the grievant's condition has
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been provided by his physician; whether such prognosis must include an estimated date of return to work; and whether an anticipated ability to return to work is also a condition of eligibility.

Those questions would have to be dealt with only at the time

that the grievant states, and his physician certifies that his
illness prevents him from working, and he stops work for that
reason.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having been duly sworn, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above-named parties makes the following AWARD:
The Employer did not violate Article VI
B.3(a) of the collective bargaining aggreement when it denied Donald Pierce's
application for extended sick leave.

DATED: June 14, 1989
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York ) ° " "

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 153 O.P.E.I.U.

RULING
Case #1330 0817

and
The New York Stock

Exchange

The Employer asserts that for the Arbitrator to allow
testimony by the Union relating to the negotiation of Article
II(f)

of the collective bargaining agreement would be violative

of the parol evidence rule, and moves that such testimony be

'•

barred on that ground.
Article II(f)

reads:

"(f) Amend dental coverage to provide for a
maximum benefit at current Metropolitan New
York 'usual, customary and reasonable fees'
for the following procedures: orthodontia,
periodontia, caps and crowns, bridgework,
partial and full dentures."
The Employer argues that the foregoing written contract
language is clear and unambiguous and hence cannot be changed by
evidence of oral discussions that took place prior to or contemporanious with the execution of the written agreement.
The Union contends

not only and simply that the words

"Metropolitan New York 'usual, customary and reasonable fees'..."
are ambiguous, but more specifically that those words should be
interpreted to mean and the arbitrator should find that they mean
that the procedures and benefits under the predecessor contract remain effective.

Those prior benefits and procedures accorded

dental benefits based on the usual, customary and reasonable fees
of the geographical "zip-code, nationwide," where the dental treatment was rendered.
There can be no doubt, irrespective of the meaning of the

r\o foregoing

arrangements

for the payment

of dental b e n e f i t s ,

that they are manifestly different on their face.
My study of the record thus far before me, and the memoranda of law I requested from the parties, have

led me to conclude

that this matter can and should be determined without technical
resort to or reliance on the parol evidence rule.
I so conclude because of the nature of the testimony
which the Union stated it would introduce if permitted to do so.
That testimony would not be of discussions between or among the
negotiators on the meaning, intent or specifics of the language
ultimately written into Article II(f).

That testimony would not

be designed to clarify any jointly agreed to interpretations of
"Metropolitan...New York fees."
Rather, even assuming no Employer case to the contrary,
the Union's testimony would be that on that point there were no
discussions, no negotiations whatsoever between the parties about
that critical language in Article II(f).

(The Union states that

its testimony would show that all that was discussed was a cap on
the fees and the question of a deductible).
Without resort to the technical provisions of the parol
evidence rule, I fail to see how evidence of no discussions on or
references to language that found its way into an executed contract
can support a conclusion that "Metropolitan... New York fees"
should mean and be read as "zip code by zip code nationally."

To

so conclude would be a major change in or reformation of the present written contract

which both sides signed, whether or not

that present language is unclear or ambiguous.

And I fail to see

how an arbitrator can effectuate such a change or reformation in
the absence of joint discussions on the point.

So, even if

"Metropolitan...New York fees" is unclear, the Union's testimony
cannot, in my judgment, provide or potentially provide the
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clarification that forms the basis of one of the exceptions to
the parol evidence rule.

Nor does the Union claim that there was

no contract, which is another exception to the parol evidence rule.
Even more in point, in my view, is that the Union's testimony, if allowed^ would show that the Union made a unilateral mistake as to what it thought the dental benefit would be.
lateral mistake is not grounds for

A uni-

rescission, reformation or

change in a written agreement, unless that

mistake was mislead-

ingly or fraudulently induced by the other side.

Here, in assert-

ing that its testimony would be to the effect that no discussions
on the critical language took place, the Union did not claim, and
I am convinced that it would not and

could not claim, that the

Employer misled or defrauded it into signing a contract containing
the present language.

So, whether its unilateral mistake was due

to a failure to carefully read the written contract and notice the
new language, or because it had some unilateral idea that the
reimbursement arrangement for dental benefits had not changed, or
whatever, it cannot now avoid the written agreement it signed because of its own mistake.
For the foregoing reasons, the Employer's motion is
granted.

Eric J. Schrnertz
Arbitrator
DATED: January 16, 1989
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) "
/

Q Q

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 153 O.P.E.I.U.

AWARD
Case #1330 0817

and
The New York Stock

Exchange

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Employer violate Article II of the
collective bargaining agreement in the payment of the dental benefit? If so what shall
be the remedy?
In view of my recent ruling in this matter granting the
Employer's Motion to bar the Union from presenting testimony and
evidence designed to change the present wording of Article II(f),
the Union is unable to make out a case proving its claim that
dental benefits are and have been wrongly paid and/or that Article
II has been violated.
Accordingly, the Undersigned duly designated as the
Arbitrator and having been duly sworn and having duly heard the
proofs and allegations of the above-named

parties makes the follow-

ing AWARD:
The Employer did not violate Article II
of the collective bargaining agreement
in the payment of dental benefits.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: January 26, 1989
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York)
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
TWU, Local 1400

OPINION AND AWARD
Grievance #20T - 88

and
The Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey

The issue in dispute is the Union's grievance of July 21,
1988 which reads:
The Union has been advised from Facility
Operations Agents at the Staten Island
Bridge that they are being forced to do
Police related work (which has been performed on overtime ONLY) during the course
of their tour. As you know this issue has
surface in the past. It was then and is
now the understanding that these details
would be permitted to continue so long as
they are performed on overtime.
The following work has been assigned to
Facility Operations Agents on overtime for
at least the past two years. A. Police diary
detail. B. Ordering advance checks for Police.
C. Monthly summons reports, and other work
which has been performed on overtime only.
A hearing was held on January 19, 1989 at which time representatives of the above-named Union and Authority appeared and
were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and

to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath

was waived and a stenographic record taken.

Each side filed a

post-hearing brief.
The issue turns simply on whether there was a bilaterally
negotiated agreement between the Authority and the Union for the
Facility Operations Agents to perform the work involved on an
overtime basis.

If so, that arrangement became a condition of

employment for the FAOs, and cannot be unilaterally changed by the
Authority regardless of its present operational ability to have
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the work done during regular hours at straight-time.
If not, the Authority

retained its managerial authority

to decide whether the work is to be done on straight time or overtime, and because under that circumstance, it is not required
under the contract to provide overtime opportunities, it may reverse and discontinue any practice of scheduling the work on overtime

and reschedule it instead during regular hours.
It is the Union's position that the agreement was reached

approximately eight years ago, in settlement of a grievance then
filed by the Union protesting that the work was not within the
FAO classification.
In short, claims the Union, the FAOs would continue to do
the work, provided that it was done on overtime.

And that the

practice over the last eight years has been in implemention of
that express agreement.
The Authority disputes the occurrence or existence and
any such agreement, and asserts that it has not been proved in
this proceeding.
The Union's evidence about the alleged bilateral agreement
is limited to the testimony of Frank Liuzzi who was Chairman of
the FOAs

at the time and who states that the arrangement was

negotiated with a captain whom he could not now identify, and that
it was in settlement of the Union's complaint that the work then
assigned to FAOs was "outside the unit - not our job."

The claimed

agreement was not reduced to writing, and apparently no other
persons were present when the claimed agreement and grievance
settlement was reached.

Also, there is no evidence of a written

grievance at the time or a written Authority answer thereto or a
written resolution thereon.

That imprecise testimony, and the
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absence of confirming documents standing alone cast doubt on
whether in fact, an enforceable agreement was reached that remains
bilaterally binding.
Yet, subsequent mutual conduct and practice of parties is
evidence of and can serve to confirm an oral agreement.

Here, for

about eight years the FAOs consistently and uniformly handled the
work only on an overtime basis.

The Authority assigned the work

on overtime, and the FAOs performed it on overtime.

The rhetor-

ical question "from where did the mutual practice come?", can only
be logically answered: "from an agreement or understanding..."
Indeed, work done on overtime is expensive to the Authority.

I

cannot believe that the Authority participated in a course of
conduct of assigning the work on overtime for some eight years, if
there had not been some agreement to do so.

Certainly before now,

if the Authority had reserved its right to reschedule it at straight
time (another assertion not testified to or reduced to writing),
it would have found ways to do so, on the same basis as now, namely
with operational changes to eliminate overtime costs.
Without the subsequent unvaried practice for eight years,
the agreement would not be proved.

But with it, the agreement

gives a rational, and indeed, only basis for what otherwise would
be an unexplained and expensive practice.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
If the FOAs are to perform the work referred to in the Union's grievance of
July 21, 1988, the work is to be assigned
to them on an overtime basis. Because the
record is unclear on who would have done
the work on overtime, when and for how
long since it has been assigned on a straight
time basis, any claim for money damages or
back pay is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
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DATED: March 28, 1989
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )SSI, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Transport Workers Union
of America Local 1400

OPINION AND AWARD
Grievance No. 21-88

and
The Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Authority violate Specification 2013
(pg . 212 of the contract) when it assigned
AOA personnel at the heliport to snow removal?
If so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on August 19, 1988 at which time reprer

^A

V

sentatives of the above-named Union and Authority appeared and
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and
to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath

was waived.
It is undisputed that historically AOA's
have performed snow removal work.

at the heliport

It is stipulated that Item 7,

paragraph C of the job specification 2013 of AOA's which read
inter alia:
"Coordinates... snow removal periods with outside contractors...Under direction of an
Operations Supervisor, leads and directs
Port Authority and contractor snow removal
teams in specific areas,"
is not the direct snow removal work or assignment about which the
Union complains in this proceeding.

Additionally, it is further

stipulated and obvious from a reading of the Specification, that
snow removal by AOA's at the heliport is not specifically mentioned as a "Specific

Function."

It is the Union's claim that the job or assignment of
direct removal of snow by AOA's at the heliport was based on the

-2-

following provision in the prior job specification (Item 10 of
the "Major Functions"):
"Performs other comparable related aircraft
operation duties as assigned."
But that the current Specification (i.e. 2013, pg
the contract),

212

of

no longer contains the aforesaid item, having

been deleted by mutual agreement of the parties in the recent
contract negotiations.

It is the Union's position that when that

"catch-all" phrase was dropped, and the job specification was included in the contract as a result of joint negotiations, the
Authority lost its right to

continue to assign snow removal work

to the AOA's at heliports.
In support of this position ,.i the Union points to a statement
by Supervisor Vince Ignizio to AOA Paul Esposito, when the latter
questioned the assignment of snow removal work, that it was included in "related duties as assigned, such as snow removal from
helicopter operating area and roadway approaches to the Port
Authority Heliports" as set forth in a unilaterally promulgated
Authority training manual entitled "Duties and Responsibilities
of the Heliport Operations Agent..."

Therefore argues the Union,

when the "related duties" clause was subsequently and bilaterally
removed from the contractual job specifications, the job function
of snow removal, founded on that clause, was per force eliminated
as a required duty.
The Union's case has a legal logic to it, even if, as I do,
agree with the Authority

that the job specification sets forth

only the principal or major duties and is not all inclusive as to
what AOA's may be required to do.

Indeed, had Supervisor Ignizio

stated that snow removal by AOA's at the heliport had been a related duty based on long standing practice, without reference to

-3the "related duties" clause of the Manual the Authority's

position

that the specifics of the job specifications are not all inclusive
would be correct.

But when a job assignment is justified on

certain specific language of the Specification, it limits the
propriety of the assignment to that supportive language, not to
the otherwise legitimate assertion that the assignment is based
on practice and/or the non-inclusive nature of the Specification.
If this was all there was to this case, as the Union contends, I would have concluded that the Authority cannot have it
both ways.

It cannot base the propriety of the snow removal work

on the "catch-all" language of the prior Specification and the
Manual and at the same time continue to make that work assignment
after that sole basis has been removed from the Specification by
joint negotiations.
But that is not all there is to this case.

Unrefuted and

determinative to my mind is the Authority's testimony that at the
contract negotiations when the Specification was changed, there
was no discussion of snow removal by ADA's at heliports, but that
the "related" clause was deleted for a sole and specific reason.
And that reason was in response to the Union's concern that unless
deleted it

could be used by the Authority to enlarge the AOA's

duties under a general umbrella of "related duties" language.
I conclude therefore that it was not within the contemplation of the parties, and not part of the Union's concern in seeking deletion of that language that there be a reduction in the
duties of AOA's performed at heliports, including the duty of
snow removal.
Put another way, the purpose and effect of the job specification change was not intended to and had nothing to do with
snow removal work by AOA's at heliports and was not intended to

-4elir.'inate or reduce any work previously assigned and performed.
Hence all the duties regularly performed were retained and preserved, the dropping of the "catch-all" language notwithstanding.
That being so, Supervisor Ignizio's statement in defense
of the assignment of snow removal was and is correct, whether or
not the "related" clause was in the Specification.

Snow removal

by AOA's at the heliport remains a duty unaffected by the job
specification change, simply because that change was for a jointly
agreed to different purpose and different effect.
For the foregoing reasons, the Undersigned, Impartial
Chairman under the collective bargaining agreement between the
above-named parties and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Authority did not violate Specification
2013 (pg 212 of the contract) when it assigned
AOA personnel at the Heliports to snow removal.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: February 6, 1989
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) ss -:
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 153, OPEIU

AWARD
Case #1330 1402

and
Public Service Electric
and Gas Company

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Board of Arbitration, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the
above-named parties, make the following AWARD:
The Union's grievance set forth in a letter
dated February 1, 1988 is granted. Ann
Marie Smith shall be upgraded to Office
Assistant and made whole for the difference
in pay between that classification and the
classification of Clerk, retroactive to the
date in December 1987 when the overhead group
in West Orange subheadquarters was relocated
to Irvington.

DATED: August 14, 1989
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

I, Eric J Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED: August
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1989

Kenneth Brandt
Concurring

I, Kenneth Brandt do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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DATED: August
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1989

Robert N. Turken
Dissenting

I, Robert N. Turken do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
Case #1330 1402 88

Local 153, OPEIU
and
Public Service Electric
and Gas Company

In accordance with the arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between the above-named Union and Compan;
the Undersigned was selected as the Chairman of a Tripartite Board
of Arbitration to hear and decide, with the Union and Company designees to said Board, a dispute relating to the staffing of a subheadquarters .
The stipulated issue is:
What shall be the disposition of the Union's
grievance set forth in a letter dated February 1, 1988 from Linda Port Vliet to Mr. J.
McAlpine?
A hearing was held on June 27, 1989, at which time representatives of the Union and Company appeared, and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.

Messrs. Kenneth Brandt and Robert N.

Turken served respectively as the Union and Company members of the
Board of Arbitration. The Arbitrator's Oath was waived. A stenographic record of the hearing was taken. The Board of Arbitration
met in executive session on August 2, 1989.
The aforementioned letter of February 1, 1988 reads:
Mr. J. McAlpine
Division Manager
Metropolitan Division
VIOLATION OF OA JOB SPEC - DUTY 5 & THE LETTER
OF AGREEMENT FOR STAFFING THE TWO SUBHEADQUARTERS - METRO DIVISION

-2Dear Mr. McAlpine.
The union met with the company on 1/25/88 to
initiate a first step grievance involving a
violation of Office Assistant job spec Duty 5.
Specifically, the union is grieving the fact
that Ann Marie Smith, a clerk, has full responsibility of the clerical routine of the
overhead line department office in building
#1, located at 938 Clinton Avenue, Irvington.
The union maintains that this responsibility
falls under duty #5 of the Office Assistant
job specs. The union also has an agreement
with the company to staff the subheadquarters
with an Office Assistant, and while the closing of the West Orange subheadquarters resulted
in the overhead and underground line departments
being located in Irvington, the fact remains
that they are housed in two totally separate
buildings and are two totally separate offices.
Since the issue was not resolved, we are requesting a second steo meeting at our earliest
mutual convenience.
Very truly yours,

Linda Port Vliet
Division Steward
Metro Division
Whether Ms. Ann Marie Smith should have been classified as
an Office Assistant rather than as a clerk on and following the
operational move referred to in the February 1st, 1988 letter depends on resolution of some or all of the following questions:
1] Was there a bilateral agreement between the
Union and the Company that each subheadquarters would be staffed with an Office Assistant to perform the administrative/clerical
duties involved in this case?
2] Whether, following the move, the result was
a combination of former West Orange departments with the line department(s) then and
previously located at Irvington, making a
single subheadquarters of what was formerly
two, and requiring thereby only one Office

_ o_

Assistant, a position already occupied at
the Irvington location by a Mr. Charles
Dyke ?
3] Whether the work performed by Mr. Dyke as
an Office Assistant and Ms. Smith as a
clerk were the same, thereby creating or
perpetuating unfair and disparate treatment
of Ms. Smith in violation of the implicit
equal treatment requirements of the contract.
4] Whether the work performed by Dyke and Smith
at the Irvington location was actually within the Clerk job description or the Office
Assistant description.
The first question was answered by Arbitrator Maurice
Benewitz in the Award and Opinion in Case #1330 0915 86, dated
July 5, 1988.
Though I am not bound by the decision of a prior
arbitrator, such decisions should not be overturned unless "palpably wrong." Mr. Benewitz was not palpably wrong. He held that
the memorandum of October 7, 1980 (which the Union relies on in
the instant case) was not a negotiated staffing agreement, but
rather informational from the Company to the Union on how it intended to staff subheadquarters. Based on the record in the instaiit
case, I cannot find enough contrary evidence to warrant a different
finding.

As with Benewitz, I

find that the memorandum is the

minutes of a meeting of the parties at which the Company informed
the Union of its staffing decisions, but that those decisions were
not arrived at by negotiations and therefore it did not constitute
a binding bilateral agreement. Indeed, in the instant hearing,
this view was confirmed by the testimony of a Company witness who
was present at that meeting.

No Union witness who testified was

present at the meeting, and the Union's conclusions on the import
of the minutes is based only on what was found in the Union's files
and other hearsay information and conclusions.
That the meeting
was informational and not a negotiation is further supported by
the undisputed fact that following October 7, 1980, the Company
made a unilateral change in the staffing of clerks, changing it
from what was set forth in the minutes, and so informed the Union,
with no negotiations and with no Union objection.

-4Therefore, on that matter, the Company's managerial rights
to decide staffing, remain intact and the Union's claim on this
point is rejected.
On question 2, the Company does argue that the move produced
a single subheadquarters, and that therefore two Office Assistants
were not needed or warranted, irrespective of any staffing agreement. The Company has not proved that a single entity was created
The evidence shows otherwise.
The incumbent subheadquarters and the one moved from West
Orange remained separate at the Irvington location. They perform,
different services and there is no evidence of any significant
overlap or synonymousness in their activities. They occupy different buildings. The only interchange of work between the two
appears to be the arrangement between Smith and Dyke to "cover for
each other" during meal periods and other short periods when one
is away. The latter is not enough to create a consolidation or
single entity. So the Company's claim on this point is rejected.
However, in view of my finding on question #1, the failure of the
Company's argument on question #2 obviously does not result in the
granting of the Union's

grievance.

In my judgment, this case is decided by the answers to questions 3 and 4. And I shall deal with them together.
It is stipulated that Dyke and Smith do the same work. The
Union argues that the duties of both are in the Office Assistant
classification, and that for that reason as well as the fact that
Dyke is so classified, Smith should enjoy the same classification.
The Company asserts that the duties of both fall within the
Clerk classification; that neither perform the supervisory functions or judgmental work required of an Office Assistant. The
Dyke classification came about, explains the Company, by a "past
practice" which the Company terminated by express notice to the
Union in the contract negotiations for a successor contract to the
agreement that expired on April 30, 1987.
That notice was set
forth in Item #17 of the Company's contract proposals in a letter
of January 30, 1987 from Mr. R. N. Turken, the Company's Industrial

-5Relations Manager to Mr. Paul Greenspan, the Union's Business Representative.
Item #17 reads:
"Informational item. Discontinue staffing subheadquarters solely with Office Assistants."
Assuming arguendo that staffing of subheadquarters with
Office Assistants was a result of past practice, irrespective of
whether or not the duties fell within that classification or the
lower Clerk classification the critical question is whether the
Company ended that practice effectively so as
cedent for or impact on the instant grievance
I conclude that it did not. If a practice is
must notice be given, but, prospectively, all

to nullify any preon behalf of Smith.
terminated, not only
examples or condi-

tions of the practice must end or be eliminated. Its retroactive
effect cannot be undone, but its prospective presence cannot be
perpetuated. And that is the problem and fault with the Company's
position in this case. It cannot end the practice, and still main^
tain substance and evidence of it with the continuation of Dyke as
an Office Assistant. A practice cannot be ended and at the same
time have its effect and

application continue under circumstances

where, as here, two employees performing the same work, remain
differently paid. The unfairness to Smith remains. The favoring
of Dyke remains. That is not an effective and persuasive termination of the past practice which created the disparity. And so lon£
as that disparity or unevenhandedness

exists, it is violative of

the universally recognized rule that under collective bargaining
agreements employees similarly situated must be equally or similarly treated. More specifically, the remaining disparity is also
violative of the job specification provisions of the contract,
whether the same work that Dyke and Smith perform are within the
Clerk or the Office Assistant classification.
For the foregoing reasons I need not answer question #4.
For as long as Dyke is classified and paid as an Office Assistant,
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Smith is entitled to the same treatment, regardless of the actual
level of the same duties they both perform.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman
DATED: August 14, 1989

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Rockland Community College
Federation o f Teachers
Local 1871

A W A R D

and
Rockland Community College
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Board of Arbitration
in the above matter, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, make the following AWARD:
Sarah Schmidt is covered by Article 15.051 of
the collective bargaining agreement.
The College violated the procedural requirements of the Agreement with respect to its
October 29, 1987 action regarding Sarah
Schmidt.
Sarah Schmidt was entitled to complete her
period of employment to and through August
31, 1988. Here, notice of dismissal on
October 29, 1989, followed by a letter making the dismissal effective October 31, 1987
was not effective for her dismissal at that
time. It complied with the requirement under
Article 15 of notice by December 1st of a decsion not to reappoint for another term, and
hence was effective to terminate her employment on August 31, 1988.
The College shall pay Sarah Schmidt her salary for the period of October 23, 1987 to and
through August 31, 1988. Offset against that
amount shall be the $2333.33 she received as
vacation pay, and-.-the $4666.67 she received as
seve,r-an.ce- pay.

DATED: October 25', 1989
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )ss

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED: October
1989
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF
)

John Beers
Concurring

I, John Beers do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED: October
1989
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF
)ss'

Joseph Suarez
Dissenting

I, Joseph Suarez do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instru
ment, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Rockland Community College
Federation of Teachers

OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
Case No. PERB A88-148

and
Rockland Community College
The stipulated issues are:
Is Sarah Schmidt covered by Article 15.051
of the collective bargaining agreement,
and if so, what then is the remedy?
Has the College violated the procedural requirements of the Agreement with respect to
its October 29, 1987 action regarding Sarah
Schmidt, and if so, what shall be the remedy?
Hearings were held on May 22 and May 26, 1989 at which time
Ms. Schmidt, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Federation and College appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. Mr. John
Beers and Joseph Suarez, Esq., served respectively as the Federation and College members of the tripartite Board of Arbitration.
The Undersigned was selected and served as the Chairman of said
Board. The Oath of the Board was waived; the parties filed posthearing briefs; and the Board met in executive session on October
18, 1989.
The grievant was hired as Director of the Israel Office
commencing May 1, 1985, following an interview in Israel by College
officials on April 24, 1985. She was terminated from that position,
by verbal notice on October 29, 1987 and then by letter effective
October 31, 1987.
The central question in this case is whether, while employed,
she was a "temporary" or "term" employee within the meaning of
Article 15 of the contract. If the former, she served at the
"will" of the President of the College, and her termination with

-2only two days notice cannot be disputed.

If a "term" employee

with service beyond one full year, she would have been entitled
to notice by no later than December 1 that she would not be reappointed for a succeeding term, and, in this case, would be
entitled to pay for the balance of the then academic year 19871988, or through August 31, 1988.
The pertinent sections of Article 15 are 15.01, 15.02 and
15.021. They read respectively:
ARTICLE 15 - Termination of Services
15.01 Temporary Appointments
The service of members of the faculty having
temporary appointments may be terminated at
will by the President of the College, notwithstanding any other provision of this article.
15.02 Term Appointments
15.021 The decision of the Board to reappoint
or not to reappoint persons with term appointments, when such reappointment would not confer tenure, shall be communicated in writing
to the person affected not later than March
15 preceding the expiration of the first full
year of service and not later than December 1
of each succeeding year. In the event that
persons covered by this provision are not advised of their renewal status on the dates indicated above, or are not provided with reasons as to why such notice is being delayed for
a reasonable period, their services shall be
presumed to have been retained. Nothing herein, however, is to be construed as precluding
reasonable delays or even changes in such determinations due to budget uncertainties, unforeseen budget cancellations and impairment.
The College asserts that the grievant was a "temporary"
employee because she was so told in the April 24th interview;
that the Israel program was a "pilot" undertaking with an uncertain future (because its original and apparently successful program had defected to another educational institution); that the
grievant was told that its continuation depended on adequate
enrollment; and that term appointments are made only by the

-3College Board of Trustees on recommendation of the President, and
that was never done in this case.
The real issue, as I see it, is not whether the grievant was
technically appointed or hired as a "term" employee, but rather
whether she had reasonable and acceptable grounds to believe she
was so hired, and whether the status of "temporary" was effectively
and enforceably communicated to her.
Based on the record, I conclude that the quantity of credible
evidence supports a conclusion that she had reasonable and acceptable grounds to believe that she was appointed as a "term" employee,
and that irrespective of the "legalities" of the appointment process, th College is now estopped from showing that she was
"temporary."
In any employment setting, the burden of defining the employee's status, is on the employer. If the employee is to be
"part-time" or "temporary" or "permanent" or "tenure tracked" it
is traditional and necessary that he or she be expressly notified
of the status in some clear and unequivocal way, preferably, at
least in the academic world, by letters of appointment or other
written communication. In my view, and in my experience, so that
the employee knows his or her status from the source of the employment (i.e. the employer) that applies for equally good reasons,
whether the appointment is "temporary" or "term."
Here, the College did not meet that fundamental responsibility
It knew how to give such notice, because there is no dispute that
there was mutual agreement that the grievant would work "parttime" on an hourly basis from May 1 to July 1, 1985, and would
begin full time work on that latter date.
It is for the period of July 1, 1985 until her termination
that the College failed to give her the requisite adequate and
decisive notice of her status.
There is a sharp dispute over what she was told when interviewed for and offered the job. The College says that she was
expressly informed that the job was "temporary" or "at the will of

-4the President" because of the uncertainty of enrollment and succes;
The grievant denies that she was so told. I credit her testimony
as accurate for several reasons.

First, the College acknowledges

that at that time, it did not believe that the job was within the
bargaining unit covered by the collective bargaining agreement.
With that view, Article 15 would not be applicable at all and it
would be unnecessary for the College to have told her that it was
a "temporary" position. Under those facts, she had no contractual
guarantees, and could have been dismissed at any time without protection by the Federation or the Agreement.
Next, that the enrollment or future of the program was uncertain, are not logical grounds to state the "temporary" nature
of the job. Clearly, if there is not enough enrollment or if for
economic or academic reasons, the program had to be discontinued,
the grievant could have been laid off or her job discontinued for
those legitimate and well recognized reasons, whether the job was
or was not identified as "temporary," and any such threshold condition of employment was not needed.
Also, the nature and content of the discussion between the
grievant and Drs. Dodge and Weitzman from the College during the
job interview in Israel, are supportive of the grievant's understanding.

The grievant testified in this arbitration that she

told Dodge and Weitzman that she was "interested in a permanent
full-time position with some future in it." In her testimony
Weitzman did deny or rebut this statement by the grievant. Dodge,
who has retired from the College did not testify. So we do not
have his support of Weitzman's version of the interview or his
rebuttal to what the grievant said she told them both. The College
did not show that Dodge was unavailable and could not testify.
When versions of a conversation are in dispute, absence of testimony by one of the principal participants, when that testimony
could be obtained, leaves resolution of the dispute to other
I
circumstances, which as here, add up more favorably and probatively,
to the grievant's advantage.

-5If the grievant had been told that the job was "temporary,"
why did she ask the College repeatedly for a letter of appointment
If she didn't know that letters of appointment were not sent to
"temporary" employees, the College had ample opportunity to tell
her that each and any time she asked for an appointment letter,
over several months during the period of her employment. If she
had been told when interviewed, and/or hired that the job was
"temporary" the College should have and indeed would have told her
in response to her request for an appointment letter, that it
would not be forthcoming because she was told the job was temporary
But the College did not do that.
Dr. Weitzman testified that she told the grievant "she would
get a letter of appointment if the President recommended her appointment to the Board of Trustees, and the letter of appointment
comes from the President." Apparently that response, in substance
at least, was what the College told the grievant each of the several times she asked about an appointment letter. Though the
grievant testified that she was told that the "letter has been prepared and was on the President's desk for signature" I need not
resolve that conflict of testimony, because the College's version
left the grievant's status at least unclear and equivocal, and
certainly was inconsistent with the College's claim that she had
been told at the outset that the job was "temporary."
Also, when hired, the grievant was given benefits that are
accorded to term employees and not to temporary employees. She
was placed in the pension plan. The College's Faculty Manual expressly excludes "temporary" appointments from the Retirement
System.

The College has not shown a pattern or practice of grant-

ing pension coverage or rights to other temporary employees.
Hence, I must conclude that the grant of that benefit, if not intended as a condition of employment for a term or permanent employee, must be construed as leading the grievant to believe that
she was not temporary, and that she was not told, or that it was
not made clear to her when interviewed and hired, that she was
"temporary."

-6Additionally, the grievant was given vacation benefits when
hired.

Yet, the Agreement excludes "temporary" employees from

vacation rights (Article 10.051).

The reference to "faculty" in

that Section is defined in Article 24.04 to include "Administrator^
I am satisfied that the denial of pension and vacation rights extends by contract and by the Manual to the administrative position
of Director of the Israel Office, if that job was temporary. But
again, because of the grant of vacation entitlement as with the
pension benefits, the grievant had sound and legitimate grounds to
believe and conclude that the Israel job was of a status other
than "temporary."
There is more that estops the College or adds evidence to
a conclusion of waiver of any claim that the job was "temporary."
The grievant's successor was hired (actually promoted from the
Associate Directorship) under conditions which undisputedly were
not "temporary." Unlike the College's position regarding the
grievant's employment, her successor started in the job right
away under a term appointment or contract. While it may be argued
that that was done because the program was then successfully ongoing in contrast to the uncertainties when the grievant was hired
the record does not show definitively or conclusively that even
the grievant's predecessor in the job occupied it as a "temporary"
employee. The College makes that bare claim, but it did not, when
only it has the employment records, show to my satisfaction by
probative evidence, that he was not a "term" or permanent employee
Again that may be explained by the then ongoing success of the
program, which became uncertain when he and the program (and
student^) switched to the auspices of another educational institution .
But the point is that under all those circumstances it was
most important if not compelling that the College make clear to
the grievant that her status, at the time the College was attempting to salvage and rebuild the program, was as a "temporary" employee.

Not only did it not do so, but it took steps inconsistent

with and therefore prejudicial to its present position.

-7That the Board of Trustees never appointed or approved the
grievant as a term employee is immaterial under the foregoing
circumstances. The College gave the grievant reasonable and substantial grounds to believe that she was not a temporary employee,
and the lack of action by the Trustees cannot be imputed to or
be binding on her, and is not enough to overturn the various
authoritative actions or inactions of the College constituting
estoppel or waiver.
For the foregoing reasons, the grievant 's termination
effective October 31, 1987 was improper. Notice of her termination
satisfies the December 1, 1987 notice requirement of Article 15.02'
of the contract, and constitutes notice that she would not be reappointed for another term. Accordingly she was entitled to
complete the term ending August 31, 1988, and shall be paid for
the last week of her employment which she did not receive plus
the balance of her salary thereafter until August 31, 1988. Offset against that sum of money shall be the vacation pay in the
amount of $2333.33 and--~sev€ranc-e,pay^^
^7 s h-e -~hi-s—r-eee i-ve<l- ~a~s —a - r«-s,yJL_t_cijL-a~ lawsuit and/or otherwise.

DATED: Octobej^-257 1989

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 144 S.E.I.U.
and
Sea Crest Health Care Center

°PINION
and
AWARD

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Ananias St. Clair? If not, what shall be
the remedy?
Hearings were held on July 28, September 26, 1988 and April
17, 1989, at which time Mr. St. Clair, hereinafter referred to as
the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and
Home appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to

offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The charge against the grievant is that he initiated a confrontation with Senior Supervisor Eunice Catling in which he
threatened her in a manner that caused her to believe that he would
harm her physically.

The Home asserts that he abused her verbally,

refused to comply with her instructions, acted disrespectfully and
insubordinately and concluded with a threat of physical retaliation
To come right to the point, I conclude that Catling's testimony is an accurate and credible account of what took place, and
that the grievant's version is contrived, inconsistent with the
facts, and therefore not believable.
Catling's and the Home's contentions are that on the day in
question, the grievant was using the floor phone for a personal
call, in violation of repeated instructions not to do so.

That

Catling could not get through by phone to that floor, and upon going to the floor saw the grievant on the phone. That she instructed
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him to get off the phone because she needed to use it; that he did
not do so until he completed using it. That he thereafter went to
her office and in a loud and angry voice demanded to talk to her
and told her that she "had to speak to him as a man."

That when

she said she didn't want to talk to him then, he went into her
office uninvited.

And that when she instructed him to leave, he

said, in a loud, and angry voice, and in very close physical proximity to her, "I'll take care of you tomorrow."
Thereafter, based on Catling's testimony and the testimony
of other Home witnesses, Catling was so frightened that, after going home, she told the Home that she was going to resign because
she was afraid of the grievant and could not work with him present
An analysis of the grievant's version discloses points inconsistent with the facts and logic, and further reveals his
hostility to and disrespect of Catling, as his supervisor.
denies he was using the phone for an improper purpose.

He

He says

that he was attempting to reach Catling to get some cleaning equipment.

Yet, he concedes that he continued on the phone when he saw

Catling get out of the elevator and walk toward him.

He says she

tried to shut off the phone while he was using it and told her not
to do that.

Obviously, if the grievant was using the phone to find

Catling, upon seeing her the natural thing for him to do would be
to put the phone down immediately because he no longer needed to
call or page her.

That he did not, but rather continued on the

phone, persuades me that he was using it for another purpose,
especially when, as he claims, he told Catling not to cut off its
use.

So I find his testimony on this point is not believable.

His

version of the events at and in Catling's office are also prejudicial to his defense.

It is undisputed that he sought out Catling
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by going to her office.

It is undisputed that he insisted that

he talk to her about the telephone incident.

He admits that she

told him that she didn't want to talk with him then.

He admits

that he thereafter entered her office while she was still outside
of it.

That act, I find to be in defiance of her expressed wish

not to talk with him then, and contemptuous of her managerial
authority as the grievant's supervisor.
He denies that he said "I'll take care of you tomorrow."
But he admits he said "If you don't talk to me today, you'll talk
to me tomorrow."

The grievant's version itself is defiant, dis-

respectful and confrontational.

His own version discloses an

arrogance and anger that supports the more threatening version
asserted by Catling.

Indeed, it is the grievant who testified tha

Catling responded by asking "if that was a threat," and that he
replied "if you want to call it a threat, that's your option."
Considering

the foregoing, I am persuaded that the grievant

said "I'll take care of you tomorrow;" that on its face and in the
confrontational setting it was not only insubordinate

but threat-

ening, and Catling had reasonable grounds to believe that she was
in physical danger and was legitimately frightened to return to
an employment setting in which the grievant remained.
The events leading up to the threat may have been disciplinarily

actionable for progressive discipline.

But the threat, and

its insubordinate and frightening content is grounds for summary
discharge, regardless of the grievant's seniority and prior record
In regard to the latter, the grievant was not an exemplary
employee.

He had received many warnings and counselings regarding

attendance, poor work performance, disputes over work duties, and
for other "confrontational" situations.

-4That being so, I cannot find the Homes penalty of discharge
to be unfair or unreasonable.
The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties,
makes the following AWARD:
There was just cause for the discharge
of Ananias St. Glair.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: May 8, 1989
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

'

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Interest
Arbitration
between
Local 144, Hotel, Hospital
Nursing Home and Allied
Services Union, SEIU. AFL-CIO

INTERIM AWARD

and
Sea Crest Health Center
This is a third Interim Award with reference to the continuing arbitration proceedings between the above parties with
respect to all matters in issue for the period January 1, 1985,
through the new contract period ending September 30, 1991, and
with respect to all issues described in the Interim Awards of
May 3, 1986, amd July 20, 1987.
Pursuant to my request, the parties are in the process of
submitting final briefs and memoranda concerning all issues in
this matter.
Pending the issuance of a final Award in this matter, and
without prejudice to any final determination that may be made
thereunder, I hereby direct that Sea Crest Health Care Center shall
pay the sum of $500.00 (Five Hundred Dollars) to all full-time
covered employees, and a pro rata amount to part-time employees,
who are currently employed at Sea Crest Health Care Center to the
extent that same may be due as per the wage increases agreed to
between the Union and other signatory Southern New York Association Facility members for the contract period April 1, 1987,

;

through September 30, 1991. Said payment shall be on account of
any and all indebtedness that may be due by Sea Crest Health Care
Center in accordance with the final Award that will be issued here-
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under and all prior Interim Awards that may relate thereto.
This sum shall be paid within 10 (ten) days from the date
hereof.

Dated: September 5, 1989
STATE OF New York)
.
COUNTY OF New York) ' "

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

ERIC

J.

SCHMERTZ

P.C.
HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL or LAW
HEMPSTEAD. NEW YORK M55O
( S I 6 > SGO - 5 B 5 4

A u g u s t 21, 1989

Mr. Frank McKinney
Pres ident
Local 144, S.E.I.U.
233 West 49th Street
New York, New York 10019
Mr.
c/o
801
New

Irwin Bluestein, Esq.
Vladeck, Waldman, Elias
& Engelhard, P.C.
1501 Broadway
New York, New York 10036

Jack Friedman
Fort Tryon Nursing Home
West 190th Street
York, New York 10040

Friedwald Home
Attn: Mr. Nat Sherman
475 New Hempstead Road
New City, New York 10956
RE: Local 144 -and- Friedwald
Gentlemen:
I enclose my Award in the above matter.
Ver^t—fruly y o u r s ,

Eric XT. Schmertz
Arbitrator
EJS:hl
Encl.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Friedwald House HRF

FINAL AWARD

and

LOCAL 144 S.E.I.U.

In

accordance with

a

jointly

signed

letter

dated

November 30, 1984 (the "Friedwald side letter") and the Local 144
- Southern NY RHCF Association collective bargaining agreement
dated

November

30,

1984

(the

''Southern

Contract"),

Friedwald

House HRF

(a member of the Southern New York RHCF Association,

Inc.) and

Local

144 have submitted various

issues to me for

binding arbitration.
The Friedwald side letter provides in pertinent part
as follows:
"Friedwald House is a non-parity facility.
As
a non-parity
facility
all
issues
relating
to
wages
and
liability
for
contributions
to
the
funds
shall
be
submitted to immediate binding arbitration
before the Honorable Eric J. Schmertz
subject
to paragraph J, Reimbursement
Clause,
contained
in
the
collective
bargaining agreement."
Both parties

have appeared before me

on numerous

occasions with respective counsel, accountants and witnesses, and
have presented evidence and their respective positions regarding
Friedwald's affordability to implement the lump sum payments and

wage increases due under the Southern Contract for the years 1984
and 1985.
Based

on

the

record

before

me,

I conclude

that

Friedwald is affordable only to the extent of paying the 6 1/2%
wage increase, effective July 15, 1984, through and including
December 31, 1985.
the

extent

I find that Friedwald is not affordable to

of paying

the

1984

lump sum

payments

due

under

paragraph II(A)(1) of the Southern Contract or paying the 1985
portion of the 7% wage increase effective July 15, 1985.

I also

find that Friedwald is affordable to the extent of making the
fund contributions provided for in the Southern Contract.
This Award is based on the particular

circumstances

and facts of this case and this Home (which is a "non-parity"
home),

and

establishes

no

precedent

for

any

facility or for any other proceeding.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

Dated:

August^-/, 1989

other

Home or

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)
) ss. :
)

I, ERIC J. SCHMERTZ, do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my Final Award.

ERIC J. SCHMERTZ

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Somers Faculty Association

A W A R D
Case #1939 0042

and
Somers Central School District

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having been duly sworn, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above-named parties, makes the following
AWARD:
The Board of Education misinterpreted and
misapplied Article XIII Section A of the
contract between the Board of Education
and Somers Faculty Association covering
the period 1987-1990 by selecting the POMCO
Health Insurance Plan instead of the Empire
Plan under the New York State Health Insurance
program.
As remedies, the Board is directed to comply
with the "So Ordered" stipulation between
the parties, introduced into evidence in this
arbitration as Board Exhibit CC.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: December 18, 1989
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York ) b o - '
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Somers Faculty Association
and

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1939 0042 88

Somers Central School District
The stipulated issue is:
Did the Board of Education misinterpret or misapply Article XIII Section A of the contract between the Board of Education and Somers Faculty
Association covering the period 1987-1990 by
selecting the POMCO Health Insurance Plan instead of the Empire Plan under the New York
State Health Insurance program? If so, what
shall be the remedy?
Nine hearings were held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association in White Plains, New York over the period
from April 18, 1988 through May 19, 1989.
The above-named Association and School District were afforded
full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses. The parties filed post-hearing briefs
and reply briefs.
Most of the hearings were devoted to extensive testimony and
to the introduction of voluminous exhibits relating to the substantive provisions, employee eligibility, benefits and entitlements under the two respective health plans (or programs) referred
to in the stipulated issue, and to whether the comparisons thereof
meant that the plans (or programs) were "equal" or "not equal"
within the meaning of Article XIII Section A of the contract.
However, fully litigated at the hearings and briefed is a
critical threshold issue. That issue is the fundamental disagreement between the parties over the interpretation of Article XIII

-2Section A, and more particularly the meaning of the word "equal"
therein.
Article XIII Section A (Insurance) reads:
"The district's health insurance plan will consist of the Empire Plan (Blue Cross, and major
medical insurance) under the New York State
health insurance program or some other health
insurance plan selected by the district that
will provide health benefits equal to the benefits under the New York State program."
On December 16, 1987 the Board of Education informed the
Association that it was transfering its health insurance coverage
from the Empire Plan to the POMCO Health Insurance Consortium.
The transfer was thereafter implemented.
The differing positions of the parties on the meaning and intent of Article XIII Section A are clear-cut and uncomplicated.
The Association contends that various coverages, benefits and entitlements under the POMCO plan are inferior to the same but prior
coverage under the Empire Plan; that the contract language
"...will provide health benefits equal to
the benefits under the New York State
program"
means the same substantive benefit for each covered illness or
medical condition as was provided under Empire; and that the variations and lesser benefits under POMCO make the transfer to and
the implementation of that plan a violation of Article XIII Sectio
A. In short, the Association says that "equal" means just that that each POMCO coverage, benefit, allowance and eligibility condition must be equal to what had been provided under the Empire
program. That "equal" means at least the "same," not a lesser
variation, and that that is what was expressly negotiated in the
contract negotiation leading to agreement on Article XIII Section
A.
Attached hereto as Exhibit #1 is the Association's Summary of
Services in which Empire Plan is Superior to POMCO Plan.

-3The District's interpretation of Article XIII Section A and
the negotiations leading to it, are different. It contends that
"equal" does not and was never intended to mean "identical"; that
the Association recognized and accepted that distinction and under
stood, as a result of the negotiations, that if the District
changed health plans, the successor plan "would be different"
from Empire, yet "equal" within the contract requirement. Conceding that some of the POMCO benefits are less than under Empire,
the District argues that because the other benefits, especially
for illnesses or medical problems more frequently encountered by
the covered employees, are at least as good and for some, better
than under Empire, the POMCO plan, "on balance" and on a composite
basis is "equal" to Empire within the intention and understanding
of the parties when Article XIII Section A was negotiated.
Attached hereto as Exhibit #2 is the District's Benefits
Comparison 1989 Empire Plan Plus Enhancements vs. 1989 PutnamNorthern Westchester Plan (POMCO).
The testimony and evidence adduced by both sides on what took
place in the contract negotiations leading to agreement on Article
XIII Section A are not only conflicting, but ambiguous and hence
inconclusive one way or the other on what was intended by the requirement that benefits of a successor health plan be "equal to
the benefits under the New York State program." (emphasis added)
The District points out that it proposed the word "equal."
that the Association countered with the language "identical and
equal"; and that when the Association dropped the word "identical"
and settled for "equal" it knew and recognized that those two
words were not synonymous, and that the surviving word "equal"
allowed for some differences and even lesser coverage in infrequently utilized areas, in any successor plan as compared to
Empire. That is a logical interpretation.
On the other hand, however, the Association's position is
equally logical. It is that because the two words do mean the
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same, the word "identical" was unnecessary; its withdrawal created
no prejudice; and in fact was first proposed and then withdrawn
not only because they meant the same and because "equal" was
acceptable to the Association in the face of what it thought was
an effort by the District to change its "equal" proposal to
"equivalent," but also in order to get the District to drop its
attendant demand that employees contribute to the cost of the
health insurance.
These two logical but diametrically divergent conclusions are
not resolved favorably to either by any other evidence of the contract negotiations at that time.
It should be clear that a substantive analysis of the comparable benefits of both plans is necessary only if the District's
interpretation of Article XIII Section A is upheld. But, in view
of the undisputed fact that some POMCO benefits are less than
coverage for the same conditions or circumstance under Empire
(for example psychiatric treatment and the maximum for major medical coverage), if the Association's interpretation of Article XII[
Section A is accepted as correct, the POMCO plan would not be
"equal"; the requirements of Article XIII Section A would not have
been met, and an analysis of the provisions of both plans, benefit
by benefit, or by overall coverage (with greater benefits possibly
offsetting lesser benefits and with consideration of frequency of
need or use) would be immaterial.
As has the District in its brief, and in any case because of
the inconclusiveness and remaining ambiguity of the negotiations
of Article XIII Section A, I shall resort to the dictionary and
to the Thesaurus for definitions of "equal." I observe, as is
well settled, that absent specific contract definitions, ordinary
or customary language in a contract should be accorded its ordinary and customary meaning and definition.
Before that however, and at this point, an evidentiary ruling
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is in order.

The question of whether the plans are "equal" does

not include consideration of the sharply increased premium costs
of the Empire plan which the District was confronted with before
it switched to POMCO, and which, obviously prompted the switch.
I am persuaded, and on this point there is no ambiguity, that
when "equal" was negotiated it applied only to the substantive
benefits, coverage and eligibility under the plan including the
availability and location of providers. Also "equality" is limited
to the plans as they existed at the time the change was made.
Subsequent benefit changes are irrelevant as they were not in plac
or among the reasons for the change when the change was made. Not
subsumed within "equal" was a possible (and by then apparent) "inequality" in cost. Of course it was clear to both sides that the
District was seeking a right to change plans because the Empire
plan had become or was expected to become too expensive. But,
nonetheless a change in plans could not be contractually justified
on economic grounds, if the successor plan did not have benefits
or coverage that were substantively equal to Empire irrespective
of the relative costs. In short, the District obtained the right
to change plans for economic reasons, but the requirement of
"equal" benefits was wholly separate from costs and had to be met
as a condition of the change regardless of cost comparisons.

Also

if the Association prevails in this proceeding, the cost of reenrolling the covered employees in the presently existing Empire
plan is also, and for the same reasons, immaterial and beyond consideration by this arbitrator. If, under that circumstance there
are unreasonable costs involved, and if the Empire plan presently
existing is substantively different from the Empire plan in 1987
or early 1988, those matters are also beyond the arbitrator's
jurisdiction. Any consideration of those possible factors and any
adjustments therein, would be matters for direct negotiation between the parties and not for consideration in this proceeding.
My reading of the dictionary and a thesaurus has produced a
different result than what the District found and argued in its
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brief. In short, I find a set of consistent and majority interpretations and definitions which make "equal," "identical" and the
"same" as synonyms of each other.
The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (The Unabridged Edition) has the following definition for "equal":
"As great as; the same as; like or alike in
quantity, degree value;
"Equal" indicates a correspondence in all
respects unless a particular respect is stated
or implied.
"Equal" is distinguished from "equivalent."
"Equivalent" indicates a correspondence in
one or more respects, but not in all, (emphasis added)
Based on these definitions, it is clear to me that the
District's argument that the POMCO plan "on balance" is equal to
Empire is to confuse the meaning of "equal" with the different
meaning of "equivalent."
Indeed, in the absence of any contractual language comparing
the plans of an overall package, or "on balance" basis, the definition of "equal" as "corresponding in all respects" (emphasis
added) must apply. To argue, as apparently the District does, tha
the same or even better benefits for some coverage, including for
illnesses and conditions more frequently experienced by the employees, offsets those that are less favorable, is to argue "equiv
alency," not "equality."
The same dictionary lists as synonyms to "identical":
"congruous, congruent, equal, matching
(emphasis added)
Roget's International Thesaurus (Fourth Edition) lists as
synonyms to "equal"
"match, mate, twin, like; keep pace with;
measure up to."
and to "identically"
"equally, coequally, on all fours with, just
the same." (emphasis added)
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This is not to say that there are not to be found some definitions that support an "equivalency" argument. Rather it is to
say that the overwhelming quantity of the definitions and synonyms
show

"equal" and "identical" to be interchangeable in meaning.

And, in the absence of any special contract definitions, or other
evidence of a different intent, the majority dictionary definitions
must prevail.
Based on the foregoing, I am persuaded that "equal" meant and
means the same substantive benefit on a benefit by benefit basis,
and not as an overview or "on balance" assessment of the plans as
a whole.

Had the District intended the latter, and because it

would have been a variation from standard and customary application
of the word "equal" it should have negotiated and included some
language in Article XIII Section A making that interpretation and
variation clear and applicable. Not only did it not do so, but in
stead agreed to language that, by any fair interpretation, support
the Association.

The language says:

"...or some other health insurance plan selected by the District, that will provide
health benefits equal to the benefits under
the New York State program. (emphasis added)
By speaking of "health benefits" in the plural as equal to
the New York State program's "health benefits" in the plural, the
only fair interpretation to my mind is that all the benefits of
the POMCO plan had to be equal to all the benefits of the New York
State program, on a benefit by benefit basis.
That the POMCO plan does not meet this test is essentially
undisputed.

This is not to say that some POMCO benefits are not

better than Empire's, or that many, if not most are as good. They
are. But in my view the contract language does not allow for consideration of the quantity of users or the infrequency of use of
the less favorable benefits under POMCO as compared to equal or
even better benefits for more subscribers.

In the face of some
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inequalities of benefits, the experience impact and its predictability are not contractual

considerations, and even if, on

balance, are salutory, do not cure the fact that some POMCO benefits are less and hence not equal.
Exhibits 1 and 2 attached hereto show the difference and
similatiries in benefits. I do not think that the foregoing ruling is either narrow or overly technical, and I find no need to
go through them one by one. Rather, let me deal with just two
examples. The Empire benefits for psychiatric treatment and for
the maximum or major medical are better than POMCO.

The Empire

psychiatric benefit for inpatient care has an annual maximum of
$120,000.

POMCO's annual maximum is $25,000.

And under major

medical Empire accords a lifetime maximum of $1 million, whereas
POMCO's maximum is $250,000.
For a psychiatric outpatient, the Empire plan has no annual
or lifetime cap on the number of visits; POMCO has specific dollar
limits for annual and for lifetime visits.
I do not think that one can dispute the following philosophical (if not legal) view of medical insurance.

Certainly, as here

it is a group plan, covering a defined group of employees. But
it is more than that. It is protection for individuals and for
families.

What is of fundamental interest to those individuals

and their families, is not the cumulative or in toto scope of the
plan, but what their particular protection is for each and every
illness or medical condition listed. It is hardly much solace to
an employee in need of psychiatric care to be told that he should
not be concerned with and accept reduced caps under POMCO because
other employees (or he under other circumstances) under POMCO can
get prescription drugs less expensively, or can gain admission to
a hospital with no pre-admission certification.

For that psychi-

atric patient, the POMCO coverage and benefits is simply not equal
to the Empire coverage, and in that situation I fail to see how
it can be successfully argued that the plans are "equal."
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The same is true in my view in connection with the major
medical maximum, $1 million under Empire and $250,000 under POMCO.
The District may be correct in its assertion that to date, no subscriber has needed more than the $250,000 maximum under POMCO.
But that does not mean that a case may not arise needing greater
coverage. I am not persuaded that $1 million major medical coverage is fanciful, fictitious or unneeded, and I do not think it is
for the District to make that judgment. That used major medical
in excess of $250,000 is unlikely or not yet experienced is not
the point.

A single future case requiring greater coverage is

enough, as to that subscriber, to make the benefit, and hence the
plans, manifestly unequal.
The District, after switching to POMCO offered to buy additional major medical coverage up to the $1 million level. That
was commendable, and perhaps should have been accepted by the
Association, if such acceptance would have been without prejudice
to its position on the balance of the POMCO plan, but it is now
irrelevant.
It's what the two plans provided at the time the
switch was made that is material. Subsequent offers, apparently
to gain acceptance of POMCO and to settle the grievance, are not
probative.
Lest the District assert that this ruling is wrong because
it makes Article XIII Section A meaningless and non-invokable by
the District, let me hasten to observe that I have had several
experiences where the same benefits have been replicated by a
successor health plan and purchased at a lesser cost than the
plan replaced. I believe that Article XIII Section A was intended
and designed for that realistic purpose.
Accordingly, I find that the District violated Article XIII
Section A of the contract. It is directed to comply with the
remedies set forth in the "So Ordered" stipulation between the
parties in a law suit related to this proceeding and introduced
into evidence in this arbitration as Board Exhibit CC.

Other
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remedies sought by the Association are denied

Dated: December 18, 1989

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

EXHIBIT #1
Summary of Services
In Which Empire Plan Is Superior -:o POMPCO Plan
Service
Annual Major Medical
Maximum

2,

3

Routine Pediatric Care
(Exams)
Routine Nursery Care

Annual Physical Exam

Psychiatric Care
(1) Inpatient

(2) Outpatient

Empire
Plan
$1,000,000

POMPCO
Plan
$100,000.00

Paid in Full Through
Participating Providers
Paid in Full Through
Participating Providers

Not Covered

Covered Under Major
Medical up to a Maximum
of $100

Covered Under
Under Major
Medical up to
a maximum of $75

Paid in Full Through
Participating Providers

No Full
Coverage

Benefits Under Medical
Plan for Employee and
Spouse Age 50 and over.
Employee - $ 100
Spouse
- $ 50

Benefits Under
Medical Plan
for Employee
Age 50 and over
Employee -$50
Spouse - $ 0

Under Major Medical

Under Major Medical

No Full
Coverage

Annual Maximum $1,000.000;Annual Maximum
(effective 1/1/89
$25,000
450 daily
Maximum $120,000
annual limit)
Lifetime Maximum
$1,000,000

Lifetime Maximum
$250,000

Maximum per visit
1-10 visits $48.00*
11-30 visits $40.00
over 30 visits $30.00

Maximum per visit
$40.00

*other than crisis
intervention
Annual Limit - None
Lifetime Limit - None

Annual Limit - $1500
Lifetime Limit-$3000

Service

Empire Plan

POMPCO Plan

6.

Hearing Aid

Exam and/or purchase
$150 every 3 years

Not covered

7.

Hospital Emergency
Care (non-accident)

Pain in full if
treatment rendered
within 24 hours
of onset of medical
emergency

(Dated 12 hours)

Ambulance

Voluntary
over 50 miles - $75
under 50 miles - $50

Voluntary
over 50 miles - $25
under 50 miles - $25

Skilled Nursing
Facility

Paid in Full in lieu
of hospitalization in
an approved facility.
365 benefit days
Each day - 1/2 day
benefit care (i.e.
730 total SNF days per
spell of illness)

Paid in accordance
with Medicare
Limitations.
100 day maximum
1-20 days full
benefits
21-100 days
Medicare co-payment

EXHIBIT #2
BENEFITS COMPARISON
1989 EMPIRE PLAN PLUS ALL ENHANCEMENTS
VS
1989 PUTNAM-NORTHERN WESTCHESTER PLAN
SERVICES

1989
EMPIRE CORE PLUS ENHANCEMENTS

1989
PUTNAM/NO. WESTCHESTER PLAN

Pre-Admission Certification required.
Paid in full 365 days per spell
of illness for medical or
surgical care.
30 days per spell of illness
for psychiatric care in general
care in general or public
hospital.
Additional days available
through major medical.
5 days alcohol/drug
detoxification.

Same as Empire with no
Pre-Admission Certification
and 120 days of care for
psychiatric admission

Paid in full; accident 72 hrs.
Illness - within 24 hrs.
$8.00 copayment per visit (no
copayment for chemotherapy,
radiation therapy, physical therapy,
hemodialysis or for emergency room
services).

Same as Empire except that
Emergency care for an illness
must be sought in 12 hours and
there is no copayment for any
services.

Surgery & Radiation Therapy

Paid in full.

Same as Empire.

Diagnostic X-ray & Lab Test

Paid in full.

Same as Empire.

Preadmission Testing

Paid in full.

Same as Empire.

Physical Therapy

Paid in full in connection with
hospitalization or surgery for
up to one year.

Same as Empire.

Alcoholism Treatment

60 outpatient visits per year.

Same as Empire.

Hemodialysis

Paid in full.

Same as Empire,

HOSPITALIZATION - BLUE CROSS
Hospitalization
(Room, Board, etc.)
Semi-Private

Hospital Outpatient Care
Accident & Emergency Illness

MEDICAL/SURGICAL/MAJOR MEDICAL
METROPOLITAN LIFE
In-Hospital Medical Care
Surgery
Assistant Surgeon
Anesthesia
Maternity
X-ray & Lab Tests
Doctor's Office
Voluntary Sterilization

1989
EMPIRE CORE PLUS ENHANCEMENTS

1989
PUTNAM/NO. WESTCHESTER PLAN

Paid in full through Empire Plan
Participating Providers.
There is an $8.00 copayment per
visit, except for chemotherapy,
radiation therapy, hemodialysis
and well child care.

Paid in full through POMCO
participating providers.
No copayment.

Major medical coverage for nonparticipating providers:
Annual deductible — $J50/Ind.

Same as Empire except for $75
annual deductible per person
and $225 per family.

— $150/A11 children

Routine Pediatric Care
(immunizations, Exams)

Private Duty Nursing

Crutches, Wheelchairs,
Prosthetic Appliances, etc.

80% reimbursement of Reasonable
& Customary charges for the first
$3 , 750. 00 of covered expenses
(Maximum copayment of $750 per
family per year.)

80% of Reasonable and Customary
charges after annual deductible
has been met for the first $2000
of covered expenses. Reduces
maximum copayment to $400 per
individual policy or family policy.

Annual and lifetime maximums
of $1,000,000.

$100,000 Annually per covered
person.
$1,000,000 Lifetime per covered
person.

Paid in full through participating
provider, otherwise, not covered.

Routine care is not covered. Only
if child has a diagnosed condition.

Covered under major medical
after the first 48 hours.

Same as Empire.

Covered under major medical

Same as Empire.

MEDICAL/SURGICAL/MAJOR MEDICAL
1989
EMPIRE CORE PLUS ENHANCEMENTS

1989
PUTNAM/NO. WESTCHESTER PLAN

Ambulance

Provided by admitting hospital:
paid in full.
Professional: $50 (Blue Cross)
plus major medical coverage.
Voluntary: $75 over 50 miles
$50 under 50 miles.

Same as Empire except voluntary
payment limited to $25.

Treatment of Alcoholism

Covered under major medical up
to seven weeks per year in an
approved facility; 30 outpatient
visits per year.

Same as Empire.

Treatment of Substance Abuse

Covered under major medical up to
seven weeks per year in an approved
facility; 30 outpatient visits per
year.

Same as Empire.

Chiropractic Care

Covered services paid in full through
participating provider with $8.00
copayment. Covered under major medical
if non-participating provider utilized.
All fees and services subject to review.

Same as Empire without any
copayment.

Annual Physical

Paid in full through participating
provider.
Employees age 50 & over up to $100.
Covered spouse age 50 & over up to
$50. These benefits not subject to
deductible or copayment.

Same as Empire except limited
to $50 for employees only.

Physical

Paid in full through participating
provider with $8 copayment.
Major Medical if non-participating
provider utilized.

Same as Empire without
any copayment.

Services for exam and/or purchase of
hearing aids covered up to maximum
of $150 every three (3) years.

Not covered.

Required for certain operations.

Voluntary Program.

METROPOLITAN LIFE

Therapy

Hearing Aids

Second Surgical
Consultation Program

MEDICAL/SURGICAL/MAJOR MEDICAL
METROPOLITAN LIFE
Prescription Drug Coverage

Psychiatric Care
Inpatient - Private Hospital

Psychiatric Care
Outpatient

1989
EMPIRE CORE PLUS ENHANCEMENTS

1989
PUTNAM/NO. WESTCHESTER PLAN

Brand Name Prescription Drug:
$4.00 copayment
Generic Prescription Drug:
$1.00 copayment
Mail Order: No copayment

Brand Names: $3.00

Covered under major medical with
maximum daily covered charge of
$450 per day.

Covered under major medical with
$25,000 annual and $250,000
lifetime caps.

Crisis Intervention: 3 visits per
occurrence; $60 per visit; not
subject to deductible or copayment.
Visits thereafter, or not related to
crisis, subject to deductible and
copayment (copayment does not apply
to annual out-of-pocket maximum).
Maximum payments at 80% of Reasonable
and Customary charges are as follows:
$48 for visits 1-10
$40 for visits 11-30
$30 for later visits

Covered up to $40 per visit
payment with $1500 annual and
$3000 lifetime caps.

Generic:

No copayment

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Amalgamated Transit Union,
Local 627
and

AWARD

Southwest Ohio Regional Transit
Authority

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Board of Arbitration
in the above matter, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties, makes the following AWARD:
1] There was not sufficient cause for
the discharge of Maurice Patmon.
Mr. Patmon shall be reinstated.
2] Mr. Patmon's reinstatement shall be
without back pay.

DATED: May 15, 1989
STATE OF New York )ss.
iOUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED: May
STATE OF
OUNTY OF

1989

Rebecca H.
Concurring
Dissenting
Concurring
Dissenting

White
in #1
from #1
in #2
from #2

I, Rebecca H. White do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED: May
STATE OF
OUNTY OF

1989

Douglas Taylor
Concurring in #1
Dissenting from #1
Concurring in #2
Dissenting from #2
I, Douglas Taylor do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I arn the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION
of
CHAIRMAN

Amalgamated Transit Union,
Local 627
and
Southwest Ohio Regional Transit
Authority

The stipulated issue is:
Whether Maurice Patmon was discharged for
sufficient cause, and if not what shall be
the remedy?
A hearing was held on January 20, 1989 in Cincinnati, Ohio,
at which time Mr. Patmon, hereinafter

referred to as the "grievant"

and representatives of the above-named Union and Authority appeared
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

Rebecca H.

White, Esq. served as the Authority's designee on the Board of
Arbitration, and Douglas Taylor, Esq. served as the Union's designee
on said Board.
Chairman.

The Undersigned was selected and served as the

The Oath of the Arbitrators was waived; a stenographic

record of the hearing was taken; and each side filed a post-hearing
brief.
The issue puts into question the propriety of the Authority's
absentee rule (Performance

Policy) and its disciplinary action under

that rule and policy as applied to the grievant.
I have no quarrel with the Authority's rule than an employee
who has been out of work must report his availability and readiness
to work by 2 PM on the day before his return.

And I have no quar-

rel with the denial of a right to work the subsequent day, if such
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report of readiness and availability has not been made known by

2 PM.
By its operational practices and the need to call in replacements or substitutes by 3 PM on the day before to maintain the next
day's schedule, the Authority has shown a bona fide business need
to require word by 2 Pm the day before from the regular employee.
Also, I have no quarrel with that part of the rule which
charges an employee with an unexcused absence on such subsequent
day if no report is made by 2 PM the day before, provided the affected employee should have been able to so report or has no acceptable excuse for not doing so.

And I have no quarrel with the use

of any such unexcused absences, in that circumstance, in the application of the progressive discipline policy for absenteeism.
What I quarrel with is the particular circumstance where the
affected employee is not only barred from working the next day but
also is charged with an unexcused absence for disciplinary purposes
where compliance with the 2 PM rule is literally impossible in all
respects.

That is the circumstance in the instant case.

The grievant was scheduled to begin work on March 21, 1988
at 6:35 AM.

He reported late for work at 1:53 PM.

(His lateness is

carried as a "miss" and is not involved in the discipline imposed
in this case).

Claiming illness he marked off sick a few minutes

later, at 2:03 PM.
Though the Authority expresses suspicions regarding the
validity of his claimed illness (a "headache"), it does not officially challenge the bona fides of that claim in this proceeding,
and indeed accepted as valid, a medical statement from the grievant's
doctor covering March 21st.
Having left work at 2:03 PM, it became impossible in all respects for the grievant to report on or before 2 PM that he was
ready and available to work the next day.

He was not only barred
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from working on March 22nd, though he called in later on the 21st
to report he felt better after seeing his doctor and could work on
the 22nd, but also was penalized with an unexcused absence for
March 22nd.

That absence triggered his discharge, as he was at the

final point and on final warning in the progressive discipline sequence for absenteeism.
It is completely well settled that to be enforceable, work
and discipline rules (including here, the Authority's Performance
Code), must be reasonable and capable of performance.

Here, as

applied to the particular facts of this case, the grievant was incapable of complying, and for him, under those facts, compliance
was literally impossible as a matter of fact and time.
In short, if he left work at 2:03 PM, because of unchallenged
illness, it was obviously impossible for him to report at least 3
minutes earlier that he was ready to work the next day.

That he

lost employment that subsequent day is acceptable and proper because
the Authority had to obtain and schedule a substitute by 3 PM, to
be sure the next day was staffed.

But I find no administrative

justification for or fairness in charging him with the unexcused
absence, which, consequently triggered his discharge.
The way the Authority applied the Policy or rule in this case
was reasonable up to the point of charging the grievant with an unexcused absence, but as applied to that final point, namely to impose an unexcused absence, was, in my view, manifestly

unreasonable

because compliance was literally impossible and that impossibility
was not due to any misconduct by the grievant or to circumstances
for which he was actionably responsible.
Accordingly, on this technical, but controlling ground, I
shall reverse the discharge and order the grievant's reinstatement.
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Based on the stipulated issue, the parties have given the
Board power to fashion the remedy.

I choose to deny him back pay.

I do so because I am not satisfied that though ill on March 21st,
as a matter of evidence, he was so ill that he had to disrupt the
work schedule by first reporting for work very late, and then,
within minutes thereafter, left claiming a headache.

Frankly, I

believe he could have continued at work, and his credibility on
this point is belied by his prior record.
Considering his undisputedly poor attendance record, which
placed him on final warning, I am not persuaded that he yet understands the precariousness of his position and his job obligations
to the Authority and to the riding public.

I believe he has been

and remains cavalier and irresponsible about his duty to achieve
and maintain a good and prompt attendance record.

To grant him

back pay and make him whole is to disregard those facts and might
be counterproductive to the notice and rehabilitative purposes of
progressive discipline that has been applied to him up to this
point.

In short, the circumstances warrant a further severe warn-

ing in the form of loss of pay for the period he has been out.

Eric J. Schinertz
Chairman
DATED: May 15, 1989

